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Department of Physics, University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong
(Dated: October 24, 2018)
What is the physical origin of player cooperation in minority game? And how to obtain maximum
global wealth in minority game? We answer the above questions by studying a variant of minority
game from which players choose among Nc alternatives according to strategies picked from a re-
stricted set of strategy space. Our numerical experiment concludes that player cooperation is the
result of a suitable size of sampling in the available strategy space. Hence, the overall performance
of the game can be improved by suitably adjusting the strategy space size.
PACS numbers: 05.65.+b, 02.50.Le, 05.45.-a, 87.23.Ge
Econophysics — the study of economic and economic
inspired problems by physical means — is the result of
interflow between theoretical economists and physicists.
Using statistical mechanical and nonlinear physical meth-
ods, econophysicists study global behaviors of simple-
minded models of economic systems making up of adap-
tive agents with inductive reasoning. In particular, mi-
nority game (MG) [1, 2] is an important and perhaps the
most extensively studied econophysics model of global
collective behavior in a free market economy. This game
was proposed by Challet and Zhang under the inspiration
of the El Farol bar problem introduced by the theoretical
economist Arthur [3].
MG is a toy model of N inductive reasoning players
who have to choose one out of two alternatives indepen-
dently according to their best working strategies in each
turn. Those who end up in the minority side (that is, the
choice with the least number of players) win. Although
its rules are remarkably simple, MG shows a surpris-
ingly rich self-organized collective behavior. For example,
there is a second phase transition between a symmetric
and an asymmetric phase [4, 5, 6]. Since the dynamics of
MG minimizes a global function related to market pre-
dictability, we may regard MG as a disordered spin glass
system [7, 8]. Recently, Hart et al. introduced the so-
called crowd-anticrowd theory to explain the dynamics of
MG [9, 10]. Their theory stated that fluctuations arised
in the MG is controlled by the interplay between crowds
of like-minded agents and their perfectly anti-correlated
partners. The crowd-anticrowd theory not only can ex-
plain global behavior of MG, it also provides a simple
working hypothesis to understand the mechanism of a
number of models extended from the MG.
Numerical simulation as well as the crowd-antiwcrowd
theory tell us that the global behavior of MG depends
on two factors. The first one is the product of the num-
ber of players N at play and the number of strategies S
each player has. The second factor is the complexity of
each strategy measured by 2M+1, where M is the num-
ber of the most recent historical outcomes that a strat-
egy depends on. Global cooperation, as indicated by the
fact that average number of players winning the game
each time is larger than the case when all players make
their choice randomly, is observed whenever 2M+1 ≈ NS
[4, 5, 6]. In fact, cooperative phenomenon is also seen in
our recent generalization of the MG in which each player
can choose one out of Nc alternatives. More precisely,
NMc ≈ NS is a necessary condition for global coopera-
tion between players in our generalization [11].
Perhaps the two most important questions to address
are why and when the players cooperate in MG. In fact,
these are the questions that the crowd-anticrowd theory
was trying to answer. On the way of finding out the an-
swers, Cavagna believed that the only non-trivial relevant
parameter to the dynamics of MG is M [12]. But later
on, Challet and Marsili revealed that historical outcomes
also determine the dynamics of MG in general. They
also found that information contained in the historical
outcomes is irrelevant in the symmetric phase [13].
Is it true that global behavior of MG is determined
once N , S and M are fixed? More specifically, we ask
if it is possible to lock the system in a global coopera-
tive phase for any fixed values of N , S and M . In this
way, players, on average, gain most out of the game. In
what follows, we report a simple and elegant way to al-
ter the complexity of each strategy in MG with fixed N ,
S and M . By doing so, it is possible to keep (almost)
optimal cooperation amongst the players in almost the
entire parameter space.
We begin our analysis by first constructing a model of
MG withNc alternatives whose strategy space size equals
N2c for a fixed prime power Nc. We label, for simplicity,
the Nc alternatives as the Nc distinct elements in the fi-
nite field GF (Nc); and we denote this variation of MG
by MG(Nc,N
2
c ). In MG(Nc,N
2
c ), each of the N players is
assigned once and for all S randomly chosen strategies.
Each player then chooses one out of the Nc alternatives
independently according to his/her best working strategy
in each turn. The choice chosen by the least non-zero
number of players is the minority choice of that turn.
(In case of a tie, the minority choice is chosen randomly
amongst the choices with least non-zero number of play-
ers.) The minority choice of each turn is announced. The
wealth of those players who end up in the minority side
is added one point while the wealth of all other players
is subtracted by one.
To evaluate the performance of each strategy, a player
uses the virtual score which is the hypothetical profit for
2using that strategy in playing the game. The strategy
with the highest virtual score is considered as the best
performing one. (In case of a tie, one chooses randomly
amongst those strategies with highest virtual score.) The
only public information available to the players is the
output of the last M steps. A strategy s can be repre-
sented by a vector ~s ≡ (s1, s2, s3, . . . , sL) where L ≡ N
M
c
and si are the choices of the strategy s corresponding
to different combination of the output of the last M
steps. In MG(Nc,N
2
c ), strategies are picked from the
strategy space S = {λa~va + λu~vu : λa, λu ∈ GF (Nc)}
of size N2c where GF (Nc) denotes the finite field of Nc
elements and all arithmetical operations are performed
in the field GF (Nc). The two spanning strategy vectors
~va ≡ (va1, va2, . . . , vaL) and ~vu ≡ (vu1, vu2, . . . , vuL) of
the linear space S satisfy the following two technical con-
ditions:
vai 6= 0 for all i, (1)
and by regarding i as a uniform random variable between
1 and L,
Pr(vui = k|vai = j) = 1/Nc for all j, k ∈ GF (Nc) (2)
whenever Pr(vai = j) 6= 0. (We remark that these two
technical conditions are satisfied by various choices of ~va
and ~vu such as vai = 1 and vui = f(i mod Nc) where f
is a bijection from ZNc to GF (Nc).)
The span of the strategy vector ~va over GF (Nc) forms
a mutually anti-correlated strategy ensemble Sa since
Eq. (1) implies that any two distinct strategies drawn
from Sa always choose different alternatives for any given
historical outcomes. Hence, the Hamming distance be-
tween any distinct strategies ~u1 6= ~u2 in Sa equals
d(~u1, ~u2) = L. (3)
In contrast, the span of the strategy vector ~vu over
GF (Nc) forms a mutually uncorrelated strategy ensem-
ble Su since Eq. (2) and the fact that λGF (Nc) =
GF (Nc) for all λ ∈ GF (Nc)\{0} imply that any two
distinct strategies drawn from Su always choose their
alternatives independently for any given historical out-
comes. In other words, the probability that any two dis-
tinct strategies drawn from Su choose the same alterna-
tive is equal to 1/Nc. Consequently,
d(~u3, ~u4) = L(1− 1/Nc) (4)
for any ~u3 6= ~u4 ∈ Su; and
d(~u1, ~u3) = L(1− 1/Nc) (5)
for any ~u1 ∈ Sa and ~u3 ∈ Su\{(0, 0, . . . , 0)}.
More generally, using Eqs. (3)–(5) as well as the fact
that d(a, b) = d(a+ c, b+ c), we have
d(λa1~va + λu1~vu, λa2~va + λu2~vu)
= d([λa1 − λa2]~va, [λu2 − λu1]~vu)
=


L(1− 1/Nc) if λu1 6= λu2,
L if λu1 = λu2 and λa1 6= λa2,
0 if λu1 = λu2 and λa1 = λa2.
(6)
That is to say, the strategy space S is composed of
Nc distinct mutually anti-correlated strategy ensemble
(namely, those with same λu); whereas the strategies of
each of these ensemble are uncorrelated with each other.
(We remark that in the language of coding theory, S is a
linear code of N2c elements over GF (Nc) with minimum
distance L(1− 1/Nc).)
We expect that the collective behavior of MG(Nc,N
2
c )
should follow the predictions of the crowd-anticrowd the-
ory as the structure of S matches the assumptions of the
theory. In order to evaluate the performance of players in
MG(Nc,N
2
c ), we study the mean variance of attendance
over all alternatives (or simply the mean variance)
Σ2 =
1
Nc
Nc∑
i=0
[〈(Ai(t))
2〉 − 〈Ai(t)〉
2], (7)
where the attendance of an alternative Ai(t) is just the
number of players chosen that alternative. (We remark
that the variance of the attendance of a single alternative
was studied for the MG [1].) In fact, the variance of
the attendance of an alternative represents the loss of
all players in the game. The variance Σ2, to first order
approximation, is a function of the control parameter α,
which is the ratio of the strategy space size |S| to the
number of strategies at play NS, alone [5].
To compare the MG(Nc,N
2
c ) with the crowd-anticrowd
theory, we first have to extend the calculation of the vari-
ance by the crowd-anticrowd theory to the case of Nc
alternatives. According to the crowd-anticrowd theory,
the variance of the attendance originates from the inde-
pendent random walk of each mutually anti-correlated
strategy ensemble. In each of these strategy ensemble,
the action of a strategy is counter-balanced by its anti-
correlated strategies. Therefore, the step size of the ran-
dom walk of a mutually anti-correlated strategy ensemble
is equal to the difference between the number of players
using a single strategy from the mean number of players
using the strategies in this ensemble [9, 10]. This random
walk idea can be readily extended to the case of multi-
ple alternatives. In fact, for the mutually anti-correlated
strategy ensemble Sλ = {λ~vu + µ~va : µ ∈ GF (Nc)},
step size for Aχ(λ,µ)(t) by Sλ
=
∣∣∣∣∣Nλ,µ −
∑
ν∈GF (Nc)
Nλ,ν
Nc
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
Nc
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
ν 6=µ
(Nλ,µ −Nλ,ν)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (8)
where Nλ,µ is the number of players making decision ac-
cording to the strategy λ~vu+µ~va and χ(λ, µ) is the alter-
native that are chosen by the strategy λ~vu + µ~va. Thus,
the mean variance predicted by the crowd-anticrowd the-
3ory is given by
Σ2 =
〈
1
Nc
∑
Sλ
∑
µ∈GF (Nc)


1
Nc
2

∑
ν 6=µ
(Nλ,µ −Nλ,ν)


2


〉
,
(9)
where
∑
Sλ
denotes the sum of the variance over all mu-
tually anti-correlated strategies ensemble, and 〈 〉 denotes
the average over time. We note that when averaged over
both time and initial choice of strategies, variance of at-
tendance for different alternatives must equal as there is
no preference for any alternative in the game.
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FIG. 1: The mean variance Σ2 versus the control parameter
α ≡ |S|/NS = N2c /NS in MG(Nc,N
2
c ) with different number
of strategies S where Nc = 37 and M = 2. The solid lines
are the predictions of the crowd-anticrowd theory whereas the
dashed line indicates the coin-tossed value.
Fig. 1 shows the mean variance of attendance as a func-
tion of the control parameter α in the MG(Nc,N
2
c ) for a
typical Nc. For the MG(Nc,N
2
c ), the mean variance of
attendance, Σ2, exhibits similar behavior as a function of
the control parameter α to that in the MG no matter how
many strategies S players have. In particular, whenever
N2c /NS ≈ 1, the mean variance Σ
2 is smaller than the so-
called coin-tossed value. (Coin-tossed value is the mean
variance resulting from players making random choices.)
Thus, global cooperation amongst the players is observed
in this parameter range. Moreover, Fig. 1 shows that the
mean variance predicted by the crowd-anticrowd theory
agrees with our numerical finding.
Further results along this line, including the mean vari-
ance of attendance as a function of the control parameter
in MG(Nc,N
2
c ) with different strategy space S, will be re-
ported elsewhere. These results all agree with the crowd-
anticrowd theory [14]. Therefore, we conclude that we
have successfully build up the MG(Nc,N
2
c ) model when-
ever Nc is a prime power.
Indeed, the MG(Nc,N
2
c ) model can be readily extended
to MG(Nc,N
k
c ) with Nc is equal to a prime power for
3 ≤ k ≤ M + 1. We found that the mean variance also
agrees with the MG and the crowd-anticrowd theory in
the MG(Nc,N
k
c ) [14]. Thus we can always alter the com-
plexity of each strategy in MG with fixed N , S and M
while the cooperative behavior still persist. As a result,
we can always keep (almost) optimal cooperation amongst
the players in almost the entire parameter space.
However, is it possible to construct a MG with Nc al-
ternatives whose strategy space size is smaller than N2c
that exhibits global cooperation? We give the answer
by constructing the MG(Nc,ηNc) model where η is an
integer less than Nc.
The basic setting of MG(Nc,ηNc) is the same as that
of MG(Nc,N
2
c ) except that the strategies are drawn from
a different strategy space. More precisely, strategies of
MG(Nc,ηNc) are picked from the set SK = {λa~va+λu~vu :
λa ∈ GF (Nc), λu ∈ K ⊂ GF (Nc)} where K contains η
elements. Moreover, ~va and ~vu satisfy the two technical
conditions in Eqs. (1) and (2). Clearly, the strategy space
size of SK equals ηNc.
As shown in Fig. 2, the mean variance of attendance
Σ2 in MG(Nc,ηNc) shows similar behavior as a function
of the control parameter α to that in the MG only for
small α. When α increases, the mean variance Σ2 in
MG(Nc,ηNc) becomes smaller than that in MG. Nev-
ertheless, the numerical mean variance in MG(Nc,ηNc)
does not agree with the prediction of the crowd-anticrowd
theory except for small α. The inconsistency is more pro-
nounced when α increases.
To account for this discrepancy, we notice that as
η → 1+ while keeping all other parameters fixed, fewer
and fewer (or even none) of the strategies in the strategy
space of MG(Nc,ηNc) makes the same choice for the same
combination of the output of the lastM steps. Therefore,
some of the choices can never be chosen for MG(Nc,ηNc)
with small η when the number of strageties picked by
the players are much smaller than the strategy space size
ηNc. In this circumstances, the attendances of most al-
ternatives are either one or zero. Consequently, the mean
variance Σ2 in MG(Nc,ηNc) with small η is much less
than N . In fact, the variance of a choice may even van-
ished for large α. Such phenomenon will be more pro-
nounced in MG(Nc,ηNc) with small η. Thus, the mean
variance in the MG(Nc,ηNc) for η ≪ Nc exhibits a rad-
ically different behavior from the MG. From the above
observation, we know that there is no effective crowd-
anticrowd interaction whenever η ≪ Nc. And in this
case, the dynamics in the MG(Nc,ηNc) is no longer dom-
inated by the interactions of the anti-correlated strate-
gies. Consequently, the crowd-anticrowd theory does
not correctly predict the mean variance in MG(Nc,ηNc).
Nonetheless, we still find that in MG(Nc,ηNc), Σ
2 attains
a minimum (and hence the average number of winning
players is maximized) whenever the control parameter
α ≡ |SK |/NS = ηNc/NS ≈ 1 for every prime power Nc
and 1 < η < Nc.
Now, we are ready to answer the two questions posted
in the abstract. First, in order to obtain the best overall
global wealth, players should switch to the MG(Nc,ζNc)
game provided that Nc < NS ≤ N
M+1
c . More specifi-
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FIG. 2: The mean variance Σ2 (square) versus the control parameter α ≡ |SK |/NS = ηNc/NS in MG(Nc,ηNc) with different
η where S = 2 and M = 2. The variance of the attendance of a choice (cross) is also shown in the figure. The solid line
indicates the mean variance predicted by the crowd-anticrowd theory whereas the dashed line indicates the coin-tossed value.
cally, for fixed Nc, N , S and M , players simply have to
agree on an integer ζ ≈ NS/Nc and the corresponding
strategy space in order to ensure the best performance
of the MG. Second, whenever ζ ≥ Nc, the mean vari-
ance of attendance Σ2 agrees well with our extension of
the crowd-anticrowd theory. Thus, we conclude that in
MG(Nc,ζNc) with Nc ≤ ζ ≤ N
M
c , the origin of global
cooperation is the self-organization of player’s tendency
to choose anti-correlated strategies in making their deci-
sion. The “cancellation” of the actions in these mutually
anti-correlated strategy ensemble leads to a small Σ2.
Finally, we remark that results on the order parameter
of MG(Nc,ζNc) will be reported elsewhere [14]. Read-
ers should note that in case Nc is not a prime power,
the presence of zero divisors in the ring ZNc invalidates
the conclusion in Eq. (6). So, it is instructive to find a
reasonable extension of MG(Nc,N
2
c ) in this case.
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